security-agent-skills
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Security-testing methodology as portable, tool-agnostic agent skills for Claude Code and any agent runtime: white-box bug hunting, AI-agent and LLM red-teaming, supply-chain risk, and appsec depth.
security-agent-skills
154 tool-agnostic security-testing skills for AI coding agents: white-box bug
hunting, AI-agent and LLM red-teaming, code-interpreter sandbox and
model-inference-endpoint abuse, server-side injection and deserialization
depth across SQL, NoSQL, LDAP, expression-language, and object streams, cloud
identity, secrets, and KMS trust, infrastructure-as-code and container/Kubernetes
and host workload trust, network, wire-protocol, and multiplexing trust across
HTTP/2, gRPC, message brokers, and mutual TLS, federation and token trust across
SAML, OIDC, OAuth, and JWT, enterprise identity lifecycle across SCIM and JIT
provisioning, directory sync, MFA and key lifecycle, Kerberos delegation, and
break-glass and machine-identity trust, account-recovery and payment-and-commerce integrity,
client-app trust surfaces across browser and editor extensions and Electron,
mobile app security, smart-contract and DeFi review across EVM and Move plus web3
account-abstraction, cross-chain bridge, MEV, signature-replay, and wallet-drainer
trust, browser third-party-script and clickjacking trust, IoT and edge BLE and
firmware-update trust, skill and supply-chain trust, API and object-authorization
depth, firmware and embedded-software trust, web and transport trust boundaries,
authentication and session depth, rate-limiting and multi-tenant isolation,
file-upload and resource-exhaustion depth, defensive detection and logging, and
appsec depth.
Agent skills that encode security-testing methodology: the reasoning, ordering,
and adjudication discipline behind real black-box and white-box testing, written
as portable Claude Code skills.
The bet is that a skill's value is judgment, not a script. Enumerate the whole
taxonomy before you look at one family. Rank is triage, not a filter. A lead is a
fact, never a verdict. That reasoning transfers to anyone, whatever tools they
run, so every skill here is tool-agnostic method. Each one names the capability
a step needs (for example, "something that answers who calls this from a real
parse") without prescribing a product. Bring your own.
Scope and ethics
These skills are for authorized security work only: your own code, OSS you
contribute to, CTFs, and engagements where testing is in scope. Every skill opens
with a scope check or gate. Nothing here targets systems you do not have
permission to test.
Install
As a plugin (recommended)
Installs all skills at once and keeps them updatable. In Claude Code:
/plugin marketplace add UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills
/plugin install security-agent-skills@unboundcompute
The skills are then available to Claude automatically, matched by their name and
description. Update later with /plugin marketplace update unboundcompute.
One skill by hand
Copy any single skill directory into your skills path:
# project-local (checked in with your repo)
cp -r skills/detecting-race-conditions .claude/skills/
# or personal (available in every project)
cp -r skills/detecting-race-conditions ~/.claude/skills/
Any other agent
The SKILL.md bodies are standalone playbooks. Point any agent runtime that
follows the Agent Skills format at the skills/
directory, or read a SKILL.md and follow the loop by hand, running your own
tools at each step and emitting findings in the shared schema.
The skills
| Skill | Lane | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| hunting-bugs-with-a-code-graph | white-box | Master loop: orient, enumerate the whole taxonomy, adjudicate |
| adjudicating-taint-paths | white-box | Turn a source-to-sink lead into a confirmed finding or a documented kill |
| auditing-guard-gaps | white-box | Find the unguarded peer of a guarded function |
| detecting-memory-safety-bugs | white-box | UAF, double-free, OOB, uninitialized, NULL deref |
| detecting-race-conditions | white-box | TOCTOU, check-then-act, atomicity, lock misuse |
| hunting-business-logic-flaws | white-box | Step-skip, limit-overrun, replay, and paywall bypass the scanners miss |
| reviewing-ai-generated-code | white-box | Hallucinated imports, insecure defaults, and claim-versus-behavior gaps in model-written code |
| finding-crypto-misuse | white-box | Nonce reuse, key recovery, padding oracles, length extension proven to a recovery |
| finding-fail-open-flaws | white-box | Controls that allow on error, empty allowlist, missing input, or a caught denial |
| auditing-declarative-authorization | white-box | Routes that skip the filter, permissive defaults, ownership not checked |
| hunting-bug-variants | research | One confirmed bug to its siblings and the paths a fix missed |
| extracting-nday-from-a-patch | research | A fix or version diff to the bug it fixed and the variants it left |
| adjudicating-dependency-cve-reachability | research | Is a dependency CVE actually reachable from your code, or noise |
| hunting-supply-chain-risks | research | Dependency confusion, slopsquatting, poisoned pipeline execution, CI privilege |
| auditing-the-lethal-trifecta | agent | Where private data, untrusted content, and exfiltration meet in one agent context |
| testing-agents-for-indirect-prompt-injection | agent | Does the agent obey instructions hidden in content it ingests |
| auditing-mcp-tool-integrations | agent | Tool poisoning, shadowing, rug-pulls, token passthrough, output injection |
| red-teaming-multi-agent-systems | agent | Agent-to-agent injection, delegation loops, confused deputy, distributed trifecta |
| auditing-ai-agent-permissions | agent | Excessive agency, missing approval gates, egress, denial-of-wallet |
| testing-rag-and-memory-poisoning | agent | Poisoned index, memory, and search results that fire on an innocent query |
| testing-llm-insecure-output-handling | agent | Model output to XSS, markdown-image exfil, terminal escapes, smuggled unicode |
| auditing-ml-model-supply-chain | agent | Deserialization RCE on model load, poisoned weights, hub name confusion |
| evaluating-model-guardrails | agent | Policy-grounded, reproducible bypass-rate testing of safety guardrails |
| auditing-skill-and-mcp-instructions | supply-chain | Lint a skill or MCP server's instruction text for hidden, override, and exfil instructions |
| auditing-declared-vs-used-permissions | supply-chain | The consent gap: permissions a skill declares versus what its code actually uses |
| vetting-skills-before-install | supply-chain | Vet a third-party skill or MCP server to an install, constrain, or deny verdict |
| mapping-attack-surface | black-box | Authorized recon to a prioritized surface inventory |
| testing-web-cache-attacks | black-box | Cache poisoning and cache deception through the key-versus-response gap |
| auditing-saml-and-oidc-flows | black-box | Signature wrapping, audience and redirect_uri abuse, replay, identity confusion |
| testing-request-smuggling | black-box | Front-end and back-end desync from conflicting length signals |
| testing-client-side-dom-vulnerabilities | black-box | DOM XSS, clobbering, prototype pollution, unsafe messaging, cross-origin leaks |
| exploiting-ssrf-to-cloud-metadata | black-box | SSRF proven to internal reach and instance-credential theft |
| hunting-iam-privilege-escalation-paths | cloud | Chain role assumptions, policy rewrites, and loose trust from low-priv to admin |
| auditing-cicd-oidc-trust | cloud | Fork-run secret exposure, poisoned pipeline execution, over-broad token trust |
| hunting-cicd-workflow-injection | cloud | Untrusted event data into a run step, privileged pull_request_target checkout, mutable-tag actions, cache and runner trust |
| hunting-non-human-identity-and-secret-reachability | cloud | Machine credentials that are live, over-privileged, and actually reachable |
| auditing-infrastructure-as-code-exposures | iac | Effective resource state after variables and defaults: public storage, open ingress, wildcard policies, plaintext secrets |
| auditing-kubernetes-workload-and-rbac-hardening | iac | What the binding graph and admission actually allow: cluster-admin grants, escape-primitive workloads |
| auditing-container-image-build-hardening | iac | What survives into the shipped image: baked secrets, root user, unpinned bases, dangerous runtime requests |
| hunting-broken-object-level-authorization | api | BOLA/IDOR: a client-supplied object reference reaching data with no owner binding |
| hunting-mass-assignment-and-property-authz | api | Payload fields the client should never write: role, owner, price, verified |
| auditing-graphql-attack-surface | api | Introspection, depth and cost, batching limits, per-field and per-mutation authz |
| hunting-redos-and-complexity-dos | appsec | Single-request DoS: backtracking regex, quadratic loops, and hash flooding with no bound |
| hunting-unsafe-archive-extraction | appsec | Archive path escape, symlink escape, decompression bombs, and post-extract execution |
| hunting-orm-and-query-builder-injection | appsec | Raw-query escape hatches, identifier and sort injection, filter-object operator injection |
| auditing-file-upload-and-content-handling | appsec | When the type one layer trusts another contradicts: active-content serving, parser exploitation, polyglots, path escape |
| auditing-android-component-exposure | mobile | What another app can reach and drive: exported components, weak permission gates, trusted intent extras |
| auditing-mobile-deeplink-trust | mobile | When an attacker URL drives a trusted action: scheme hijack, unvalidated params, WebView and JS-bridge trust |
| hunting-mobile-secret-and-storage-exposure | mobile | A real credential a real reader can reach: embedded secrets, unsafe storage, credential-versus-identifier |
| auditing-browser-extension-trust | client-app | What another page can reach through the extension: external messaging, content-script channels, host permissions, DOM sinks |
| auditing-editor-extension-workspace-trust | client-app | What an untrusted repository makes the editor do on open: auto-run tasks, debug launches, workspace-sourced tool paths |
| auditing-electron-ipc-trust | client-app | When renderer content reaches a native capability: contextIsolation, nodeIntegration, the preload bridge, IPC handlers |
| hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation | host | Setuid/setgid and capability carriers paired with a reachable exec, read, write, or load primitive |
| hunting-scheduled-job-and-search-path-hijacks | host | Writable job scripts, PATH hijack, and wildcard/argument injection (filenames as flags) |
| hunting-dynamic-linker-hijacks | host | Preload across a boundary, writable library paths, rpath and $ORIGIN into a writable dir |
| testing-smtp-smuggling-and-email-spoofing | network | SMTP smuggling boundary desync, SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment and enforcement gaps, open relay |
| enumerating-snmp-exposure | network | Default community strings, downgrade, sensitive read views, and writable device state |
| auditing-ssh-trust-and-agent-forwarding | network | Forwarded-agent abuse, proxy-command injection, host-key trust gaps, loose key options |
| auditing-tls-and-certificate-validation | network | When the client accepts a certificate it should reject: disabled verification, trust-all managers, downgrade |
| auditing-grpc-service-authorization | wire-trust | The method the interceptor does not cover: unary-versus-streaming gaps, per-method authz, reflection, transcoding gateways |
| auditing-websocket-connection-trust | wire-trust | Trust checked once at the upgrade, never per message: origin gates, per-message authz, message-as-transport sinks |
| auditing-jwt-verification-trust | wire-trust | When a signed token is verified on its own terms: header-chosen algorithm, key confusion, kid/jku injection, unchecked claims |
| auditing-security-logging-completeness | defense | Whether security decisions are recorded, plus secrets-in-logs and log injection |
| reviewing-detection-rules-for-evasion | defense | Variant, anchor, and self-defeating-exclusion bypasses of detection-as-code rules |
| auditing-serverless-event-source-trust | defense | Event handlers that trust the payload or its source; event injection and blast radius |
| auditing-secure-boot-and-firmware-signing | firmware | Does a verified signature gate every path to flash and boot |
| hunting-firmware-secrets-and-debug-interfaces | firmware | Embedded secrets, backdoor credentials, debug consoles, and unauthenticated command paths |
| auditing-webhook-authenticity-and-callback-trust | web-trust | Proving the webhook caller and pinning the callback target against SSRF |
| auditing-cors-and-cross-origin-trust | web-trust | Reflected origins, null origin, substring allowlists, and postMessage origin checks |
| reviewing-content-security-policy | web-trust | Whether a policy actually stops injected script or only looks strict |
| hunting-subdomain-takeover-and-dangling-dns | web-trust | Who can claim the name you still point at: dangling records, delegation takeover, teardown ordering |
| auditing-webauthn-and-passkey-flows | auth | Passkey and WebAuthn ceremonies: challenge binding, origin, user-verification and counter checks |
| auditing-device-code-and-pkce-flows | auth | Proof-key and device-code grants: a code becoming a token without proof |
| auditing-randomness-and-nonce-quality | auth | Guessable-by-construction secrets: weak generators, short or reused nonces, low entropy |
| auditing-session-lifecycle-and-fixation | auth | Whether a session is rotated, scoped, and destroyed: fixation, post-logout replay, endless lifetime |
| reviewing-rate-limiting-and-abuse-controls | abuse | Missing, spoofable-keyed, or per-instance limits on sensitive and expensive endpoints |
| auditing-multi-tenant-isolation | abuse | Whether every data operation is scoped to the caller's tenant |
| hunting-smart-contract-reentrancy | web3 | Acting on state not yet updated: interaction-before-effects, cross-function and read-only reentrancy |
| auditing-smart-contract-access-control | web3 | Who may call the privileged function: missing modifiers, unprotected initializers, attacker delegatecall |
| hunting-defi-economic-and-oracle-flaws | web3 | Profiting by moving a price nobody bounded: spot-oracle and flash-loan manipulation, rounding, share math |
| auditing-move-resource-ownership | web3 | Move (Aptos and Sui): acting on a resource without proving ownership, capability leaks, ability misuse |
| hunting-blind-and-second-order-sql-injection | injection | Boolean, time, and error blind paths, plus stored input that executes on a later read |
| hunting-nosql-operator-and-where-injection | injection | A value arriving as a query operator or a server-side where/JS expression |
| hunting-ldap-injection-and-bind-trust | injection | Filter injection and bind logic that lets input decide authentication |
| hunting-expression-language-injection | injection | Template and expression contexts that evaluate a string as a program |
| hunting-search-engine-injection | injection | Query-DSL and script-query injection into a search backend |
| hunting-connection-string-and-jdbc-url-injection | injection | Attacker-set connection targets and driver properties that load or exfiltrate |
| hunting-server-side-prototype-pollution | injection | One request mutating a base prototype to change every object's behavior |
| hunting-java-deserialization-gadget-chains | deserialization | Untrusted object streams reaching a gadget chain that runs code on read |
| hunting-python-unsafe-deserialization | deserialization | pickle, YAML, and loaders that call a function while loading data |
| hunting-php-object-injection-pop-chains | deserialization | unserialize reaching a property-oriented chain through magic methods |
| hunting-dotnet-deserialization-type-injection | deserialization | Type-name-carrying formatters that instantiate an attacker-chosen type |
| auditing-datastore-exposure-and-abuse | datastore | Unauthenticated caches and databases reachable as a command surface |
| auditing-presigned-url-scope-abuse | cloud | Signed URLs granting more path, method, or lifetime than the request intended |
| auditing-cross-account-role-trust-boundaries | cloud | Trust policies that admit the wrong external principal without a condition |
| mapping-service-account-impersonation-chains | cloud | Token, impersonation, and key grants that let one identity become another |
| auditing-ecs-task-metadata-boundaries | cloud | Containers reaching task or instance credentials they should not |
| reviewing-secrets-manager-access-policy-trust | cloud | Who can actually read a secret across resource, identity, and key policy |
| auditing-kms-key-policy-and-envelope-encryption | cloud | Who can decrypt: key-policy grants, grants, and envelope-key reach |
| auditing-observability-pipeline-collector-trust | cloud | Telemetry collectors trusting the payload or its source as input |
| auditing-s3-object-ownership-trust | cloud | When the object, not the bucket, decides who can read or overwrite |
| auditing-iac-module-and-provider-supply-chain | iac | Third-party modules and providers running code at plan and apply |
| auditing-terraform-state-and-backend-trust | iac | State files and backends that expose secrets or accept tampering |
| hunting-helm-template-and-values-injection | iac | Chart values that render into manifests as privilege or injection |
| auditing-ansible-become-and-vault-trust | iac | Privilege escalation, vault handling, and control-node trust in playbooks |
| hunting-container-escape-surface | k8s | Privileged, capability, and mount configurations that reach the host |
| auditing-admission-control-policy-gaps | k8s | Admission policies that fail open, miss resources, or can be bypassed |
| mapping-pod-to-cloud-credential-reach | k8s | The cloud blast radius of one compromised pod's identity |
| auditing-network-policy-segmentation-gaps | k8s | Default-open pod networking and policies that do not actually segment |
| auditing-service-mesh-mtls-and-authz-trust | k8s | Mesh mTLS and authorization asserting a trust it does not enforce |
| auditing-workload-secret-exposure-surface | k8s | Every reader of a workload secret: env, volume, RBAC, and node |
| hunting-kubelet-and-node-api-exposure | k8s | Kubelet and node APIs exposing exec, logs, and workload control |
| auditing-namespace-as-tenant-boundary | k8s | What a namespace does not isolate when treated as a tenant boundary |
| auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust | k8s | Injected init and sidecar containers sharing a pod's trust |
| auditing-container-image-provenance | container | Mutable tags, unverified signatures, and image-to-artifact drift |
| auditing-container-runtime-and-socket-exposure | container | A runtime socket or API handle that is a handle on the host |
| auditing-host-mount-and-device-exposure | container | Host path and device mounts opening a route into the node filesystem |
| hunting-http-request-smuggling-and-desync | network | Front-end and back-end parsers disagreeing on where a request ends |
| hunting-dns-rebinding-and-ssrf-pivots | network | SSRF, DNS rebinding, and redirect pivots turning the server into a proxy |
| auditing-http2-and-grpc-multiplexing-trust | wire-trust | h2c downgrade, pseudo-header forgery, and per-stream versus per-connection trust |
| auditing-message-broker-topic-authorization | wire-trust | Topic ACLs, wildcard subscribes, and cross-tenant reach on MQTT, Kafka, and AMQP |
| hunting-mutual-tls-and-service-identity-gaps | wire-trust | Certificates requested not required, chain validity mistaken for identity |
| auditing-oauth-token-audience-and-scope-trust | auth | Audience, issuer, and scope confusion accepting a token outside its domain |
| auditing-saml-and-oidc-federation-trust | auth | Signature wrapping, issuer/audience/nonce, and unbound subject in federation |
| auditing-jwt-verification-and-key-trust | auth | Algorithm confusion, attacker-chosen keys, decode-without-verify, unenforced claims |
| auditing-account-recovery-and-reset-trust | auth | Weak reset tokens, multi-factor bypass, and host-poisoned reset links |
| auditing-payment-state-machine-and-idempotency | payment | Out-of-order and replayed transitions releasing value before settlement |
| auditing-payment-callback-and-amount-integrity | payment | Forged callbacks and unreconciled amounts marking an order paid |
| hunting-price-and-coupon-manipulation | payment | Client-set prices, negative quantities, and coupon stacking that lower the total |
| hunting-code-interpreter-and-tool-sandbox-escape | ai-app | Model-generated code reaching network, host FS, credentials, or the host |
| auditing-system-prompt-and-context-leakage | ai-app | Secrets in the prompt, unscoped retrieval, and session or tenant memory bleed |
| auditing-ml-inference-endpoint-abuse | ai-app | Denial-of-wallet, model extraction, and membership inference on a served model |
| hunting-mev-and-transaction-ordering-exposure | web3 | Sandwichable swaps, sequencing races, and mempool intent leakage |
| auditing-account-abstraction-and-paymaster-trust | web3 | ERC-4337 validation gaps and drainable paymaster sponsorship |
| auditing-cross-chain-bridge-and-message-trust | web3 | Forged proofs, spoofable quora, replay, and unbalanced lock/mint accounting |
| hunting-signature-replay-and-eip712-domain-trust | web3 | Missing nonce or domain binding letting a signature replay or cross contexts |
| hunting-wallet-drainer-and-dapp-approval-abuse | web3 | Unlimited approvals, overbroad permits, and blind-signing that drain a wallet |
| auditing-third-party-script-and-sri-trust | browser | Unpinned external script and permissive CSP enabling in-page skimming |
| auditing-clickjacking-and-ui-redressing | browser | Framing and overlay redressing a sensitive one-click action |
| auditing-ble-and-gatt-authorization | iot-edge | GATT characteristics without device-side authorization, pairing, or replay protection |
| auditing-ota-and-firmware-update-channel-trust | iot-edge | Unsigned, swapped, or rolled-back firmware installing on a device |
| auditing-scim-provisioning-trust | identity | Weak SCIM token, missing tenant scoping, and over-granting group mapping |
| auditing-jit-provisioning-and-role-mapping | identity | First-login claims mapping to over-privilege or wrong-tenant auto-join |
| auditing-sso-logout-and-session-revocation | identity | Sessions and tokens outliving logout, single logout, disable, or reset |
| hunting-kerberos-and-ad-delegation-abuse | identity | Unconstrained delegation and roastable service accounts reaching higher privilege |
| auditing-mfa-enrollment-and-reset-abuse | identity | Enrolling, resetting, or skipping a second factor from a stolen first factor |
| auditing-api-key-and-token-lifecycle | identity | Over-scoped, unexpiring, leaked, or unrevocable keys granting standing access |
| auditing-service-account-key-lifecycle | identity | Over-privileged, unrotated, or exportable service-account keys in repos and CI |
| auditing-directory-sync-trust | identity | Bulk sync trusting source attributes to set privilege, tenancy, or identity |
| auditing-idp-initiated-flow-trust | identity | Unsolicited assertions replayed, cross-audience, or redirecting via RelayState |
| hunting-tenant-onboarding-and-discovery-abuse | identity | Domain auto-join, unproven claims, and unbound invites into a tenant |
| auditing-break-glass-account-trust | identity | Static, unwatched, or over-granted emergency access outliving the emergency |
| auditing-machine-identity-issuance | identity | Forgeable proofs and over-broad federation trust minting machine identities |
| writing-vuln-reports | reporting | Confirmed finding to a reproducible writeup |
Every finding, from any skill, is emitted in the shared
finding schema, so results are consistent, deduplicable, and
ready for writing-vuln-reports without reformatting.
Each skill is a directory with a SKILL.md (YAML frontmatter plus body). The
white-box skills assume you have some way to answer structural questions from a
real parse: a code property graph, a static analyzer, or careful manual tracing
on a small target. The method does not depend on which.
Roadmap
- White-box: code-graph bug hunting, taint adjudication, guard-gap audit,
memory safety, race conditions - Reporting: finding to reproducible writeup
- Black-box: attack-surface recon and triage
- Research: bug-variant hunting, n-day from a patch, dependency-CVE
reachability - AI-agent red-teaming: the lethal trifecta, indirect prompt injection,
MCP tool-integration abuse, multi-agent and delegation abuse, agent
permissions and least-privilege, RAG and memory poisoning, insecure
output handling - AI/ML security depth: untrusted model supply chain, guardrail evaluation,
AI-generated-code review - Supply chain: dependency confusion, slopsquatting, poisoned pipeline
execution, CI privilege abuse - Skill and MCP supply-chain trust: instruction-text linting, the
permission consent-gap, and vetting a third-party skill or server to an
install-or-deny verdict before you trust it - Business-logic depth: step-skip, limit-overrun, replay, and paywall bypass
- Web depth: cache poisoning and cache deception
- Access-control depth: fail-open controls, declarative authorization gaps
- Appsec depth: crypto misuse, federation (SAML and OIDC) flows, request
smuggling, client-side DOM attacks, SSRF to cloud metadata - Cloud identity and CI/CD trust: IAM privilege-escalation paths, pipeline
OIDC-trust abuse, CI/CD workflow injection (untrusted data into a
privileged run step), non-human identity and secret reachability - API and object-authorization depth: broken object-level authorization
(BOLA/IDOR), mass assignment and object-property authorization, GraphQL
attack surface - Host privilege escalation: setuid and capability carriers, scheduled-job
and search-path hijacks (including wildcard/argument injection),
dynamic-linker hijacks - Network-service trust: SMTP smuggling and email spoofing, SNMP exposure,
SSH trust and agent forwarding - Injection and resource-exhaustion depth: ReDoS and algorithmic-complexity
denial of service, unsafe archive extraction, ORM and query-builder
injection, file-upload and content handling - Defensive detection and logging: security-logging completeness,
detection-rule evasion review, serverless event-source trust - Firmware and embedded-software trust: secure-boot and firmware-signing
audit, embedded-secret and debug-interface hunting - Web trust boundaries: webhook authenticity and callback-SSRF, CORS and
cross-origin trust, content-security-policy review, subdomain takeover
and dangling DNS - Authentication and session depth: passkey and WebAuthn ceremonies,
proof-key and device-code grants, randomness and nonce quality, session
lifecycle and fixation - Abuse and isolation: rate-limiting and abuse-control coverage,
multi-tenant isolation - Infrastructure-as-code and container hardening: cloud resource
exposures, Kubernetes workload and RBAC hardening, container image build
hardening - Transport trust: TLS and certificate validation
- Mobile app security: Android component exposure, mobile deep-link trust,
mobile secret and storage exposure - Smart-contract and DeFi review: reentrancy, access control, economic and
oracle manipulation, Move resource-ownership and capability safety (Aptos
and Sui) - Client-app trust surfaces: browser-extension message and permission trust,
editor-extension workspace trust, Electron renderer-to-native IPC trust - Wire-protocol and token trust: gRPC service authorization, WebSocket
connection trust, JWT verification trust - Server-side injection and deserialization depth: blind and second-order
SQL, NoSQL operator and where injection, LDAP injection and bind trust,
expression-language injection, search-engine injection, connection-string
and JDBC-URL injection, server-side prototype pollution, and Java,
Python, PHP, and .NET deserialization gadget and object-injection chains,
plus unauthenticated datastore exposure - Cloud identity, secrets, and IaC trust: presigned-URL scope, cross-account
role trust boundaries, service-account impersonation chains, ECS task
metadata boundaries, secrets-manager and KMS access trust, S3
object-ownership trust, observability-collector trust, IaC module and
provider supply chain, Terraform state and backend trust, Helm
template/values injection, and Ansible become and vault trust - Kubernetes, container, and host workload trust: container escape surface,
admission-control policy gaps, image provenance, pod-to-cloud credential
reach, network-policy segmentation, service-mesh mTLS and authz, workload
secret exposure, kubelet and node-API exposure, namespace-as-tenant
boundary, runtime and socket exposure, init/sidecar injection trust, and
host mount and device exposure - Network, multiplexing, and service-identity trust: HTTP request smuggling
and desync, DNS rebinding and SSRF pivots, HTTP/2 and gRPC multiplexing
trust, message-broker topic authorization, and mutual-TLS service identity - Federation, token, and recovery trust: OAuth audience and scope, SAML and
OIDC federation, JWT verification and key trust, and account-recovery and
reset trust - Payment and commerce integrity: payment state machine and idempotency,
payment callback and amount integrity, and price and coupon manipulation - Emerging surfaces: AI-application code-interpreter sandbox escape,
system-prompt and context leakage, and inference-endpoint abuse; web3
MEV, account abstraction, cross-chain bridge, signature replay, and
wallet-drainer trust; browser third-party-script and clickjacking trust;
and IoT/edge BLE and firmware-update trust - Enterprise identity and provisioning: SCIM and just-in-time provisioning
trust, SSO logout and session revocation, Kerberos and AD delegation
abuse, MFA enrollment and reset abuse, API-key and service-account key
lifecycle, directory-sync trust, IdP-initiated flow trust, tenant
onboarding and discovery abuse, break-glass account trust, and
machine-identity issuance
Design
These are built on the patterns that make skills reliably trigger and get used:
gerund names, a description written as a routing rule (what plus when plus
trigger terms, third person), a lean body with progressive disclosure, concrete
worked examples, and a "rationalizations to reject" section per skill. See
CONTRIBUTING.md for the authoring checklist. The structure is
informed by Anthropic's Agent Skills guidance and the conventions of existing
open-source security skill libraries.
Contributing
Contributions are welcome. New skills lead with tool-agnostic method, keep the
scope check, name capabilities rather than products, and emit the shared finding
schema. Read CONTRIBUTING.md before opening a PR, and file an
issue first if you want to discuss a new skill or a larger change.
License
MIT. See LICENSE.
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