xahau-mcp
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First MCP for the Xahau network — offline Hook intelligence (WASM inspection + a Hooks-specific static-analysis rule engine), read-only ledger/codec/governance tools, and unsigned-tx builders. Read-only, no key custody.
xahau-mcp
A Model Context Protocol server for the Xahau network with two firsts: it runs a Hook's real WebAssembly bytecode in a local VM (no xahaud node required), and it runs a Hooks-specific static-analysis / security rule engine over it — both fully offline. Around that core it adds read-only ledger access, a Xahau-aware binary codec, an instruction-count fee estimate, network-reward math, governance helpers, and unsigned-transaction builders.
Xahau is the XRPL fork whose flagship feature is Hooks — small on-ledger WebAssembly smart contracts. There was no MCP for Xahau and no static analyzer for Hooks; this is both.

Why it's useful
Point any MCP-capable agent (Claude, etc.) at this server and it can:
See the future before signing —
simulate_transactionis a pre-sign flight simulator: every hook an unsigned transaction would trigger runs as real bytecode against live ledger state, with per-hook accept/rollback, decoded emitted transactions, simulated state writes and labeled static engine preflights. Its siblingwhat_ifis a time machine: replay any real historical transaction — with your modifications — at its original ledger. Verified to reproduce a real claim's emittedGenesisMintpayout to the drop (72,251,963 drops), test-locked.Run a Hook without deploying it —
execute_hookinstantiates the real CreateCode WASM in a local VM, supplies the Hook API over a simulated transaction + ledger state, and reports the actualaccept/rollbackdecision, return code/string, state writes, emitted transactions and a call trace. The first dev-accessible Hook simulator that needs noxahaudnode.Audit a Hook before it's installed — paste the CreateCode WASM (or an on-ledger hook hash) and get SARIF-lite findings: missing
accept/rollbackexit, unguarded loops (_g), unknownenvimports, dangerousHookGrants, over-broadHookOn, and more.Decode the cryptic
HookOnbitmap in both directions — the 256-bit, inverted, active-low mask (with the active-high SetHook bit) is easy to get wrong; here it's verified and round-trip-tested.Read Xahau ledger state — accounts, installed hooks, hook definitions, hook state, transactions (with
HookExecutionsmetadata), ledgers.Answer the #1 retail question —
reward_statustells any account whether it's opted in to Xahau network rewards (Balance Adjustments), the exact XAH accrued — computed with the genesis reward hook's own formula and live parameters, verified to reproduce a real on-chain payout to the drop — when it can next claim, and whether the claim is overdue (late claiming forfeits yield).Diagnose an Evernode host —
evernode_host_diagnosticsautomates the official troubleshooting checklist for Xahau's largest operator group: registration, heartbeat liveness (the actual on-chain active rule), reputation, EVR trustline, lease offers, specs and accumulated rewards, in one read-only call.Explain a failed transaction —
diagnose_failed_txturns an engine result + hook return strings into a plain-English cause and a concrete fix.Watch governance live —
governance_statedecodes the Genesis Governance Game's full hook state: who holds the 20 seats, every open vote and tally, and whether a change (member swap, reward-rate change) is about to be actioned. No explorer shows this.Build unsigned transactions (SetHook, ClaimReward, Payment) with an automatic security preflight — returned unsigned, to be signed offline.
Why this is the most advanced blockchain MCP we know of
Strong claim, so here is the checkable evidence (2026-06-11). To our knowledge no MCP for ANY
chain — Ethereum, Solana, Bitcoin, XRPL or otherwise — combines even two of these; the closest
comparators are cloud-simulation MCPs (e.g. Tenderly's, which simulates on their hosted
infrastructure) and standalone analyzers (e.g. Slither, which is EVM-only and not an MCP):
- Executes real on-chain contract bytecode in a LOCAL VM —
execute_hookruns the actual
CreateCode WASM with no node, no cloud, no account. Not an ABI wrapper, not a hosted simulator. - Publishes a measured, regression-locked fidelity score against chain ground truth —
vm_fidelity_reportreplays 30 real mainnet hook executions: 30/30 agree (100%), 0 degraded,
including the foreign-state-reading hook that dominates live traffic. Those 30 are all
accept-direction (live Xahau traffic is heartbeat-dominated), and the metric says so itself —
it reports the accept/rollback composition and warns that an accept-only corpus can't distinguish
the VM from an always-accept stub. The rollback direction is exercised on real genesis bytecode
(governanceInvoke→ rollback) intests/regression.test.ts.
The corpus, the method and the honest history (25% → 0% → 100%) are in
docs/FIDELITY.md. We know of no other blockchain MCP that even attempts this. - In-protocol static security analysis — a Hooks-specific rule engine (SARIF-lite findings),
calibrated against the network's own genesis hooks. - In-protocol differential fuzzing —
fuzz_hookmaps a contract's accept/reject decision
boundary in the local VM. - Post-mortems real transactions with real bytecode —
hook_execution_postmortemreplays what
actually fired on chain and compares. - Reproduces on-chain economics exactly —
reward_statusre-implements the genesis reward
hook's formula and reproduces a real emitted payout to the drop (verified, test-locked). - Decodes live governance end-to-end —
governance_stateshows every seat, vote, tally and
threshold of the Governance Game, live. - Operational doctors for the ecosystem's real pain: failed-tx diagnosis with cause+fix,
Evernode host health, claim-overdue detection.
Every claim above is reproducible from this repo: the corpus is committed, the tests assert the
numbers, and the canonical sources (xahaud genesis hooks, evernode-js-client) are cited in code.
Safety posture
Read-only toward the network. There is no
submitand nosignanywhere in this server.No key custody. Builder tools never accept a secret/seed and always return an unsigned transaction plus instructions to sign offline (e.g. with xaman or
xrpl-accountlib). They default to testnet.Honest fidelity.
execute_hookruns the real bytecode against a simulated environment. The VM implements a large slice of the 78-function Hook API — the full XFL float API (verified againstfloat_one), the slot table + STObject subfield extraction (slot_subfield/sto_subfield, byte-exact against real txns), state,otxn_*/hook_*,util_accid/util_raddr/util_verify/util_sha512h, and more. STObject mutation (sto_emplace/erase/validate),util_keylet(account + hook verified against live ledger indexes; offer/escrow/check/ticket/signers canonical + fail-safe),slot_set+ foreign hook state (state_foreign/state_foreign_set) with async pre-resolve (execute_hook resolveKeylets:truefetches the ledger objects AND foreign-state entries the hook reads — iteratively, since one resolved read can expose the next — and re-runs),slot_float/float_sto(STAmount ⇄ XFL, the issued layout below bit 63 is the XFL layout), and 32-byte state-key padding (short keys are left-zero-padded exactly as on-ledger) are now supported.state_foreign_setrecords the write but does NOT model the on-chain HookGrant requirement;etxn_detailsserves a disclosed SYNTHETIC placeholder (listed insyntheticCalls, cannot change the accept/rollback decision). What still can't be faithful is honestly recorded: unverified keylet subtypes,meta_slot, and other un-modelled calls return the realNOT_IMPLEMENTEDcode, are listed inunsupportedCalls, and mark the rundegraded— never faked. The VM models the guard budget (_genforces each guard's declaredmaxiter→GUARD_VIOLATION), and reportsstateApplied(state writes commit only onaccept, discarded onrollback). It is not a consensus-faithfulxahaudreplica — it has no fee/fuel metering beyond guards, XFL math truncates rather than round-half-up (sofloat_mulratio's round-up flag and last-significant-digit results can differ), value-level math is verified only where tested. Hooks with a loop but no_gguard are refused before execution (invalid on-chain), and guarded runs are bounded by a VM budget (1M cumulative guard calls / 2s wall clock — labeled as a local VM cap, not a consensus limit); always confirm financial/resource hooks on testnet.hook_dry_runisSTATIC_ONLY,compute_rewardisDOCUMENTED_MODEL(legacy — preferreward_status, whoseREWARD_HOOK_FORMULAre-implementsreward.cexactly and reproduces a real on-chainGenesisMintpayout to the drop),estimate_hook_feeisESTIMATE.Resources & prompts. Beyond tools, the server exposes MCP resources (
xahau://rules,xahau://hook-api,xahau://tx-types) and guided prompts (audit_hook,simulate_hook,explain_hook) so agents can pull reference data and run the common workflows directly.
Tools
Hook intelligence (offline — the core)
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
execute_hook |
Run the real Hook bytecode in a local VM against a simulated tx/state → actual accept/rollback, return code, state writes, emits, trace (LOCAL_VM). |
simulate_transaction |
PRE-SIGN FLIGHT SIMULATOR — predict an unsigned tx's fate: originator + stakeholder hook chains (order canonical from xahaud Transactor.cpp/applyHook.cpp) run as real bytecode against live state; per-hook verdicts, decoded emits, state writes, static engine preflights, scam score. |
what_if |
TIME MACHINE — fetch a real historical tx, apply your overrides, re-simulate at its original ledger. Reproduces the real reward claim's GenesisMint to the drop (test-locked). |
fuzz_hook |
Differential fuzzing: sweep many generated transactions through the VM to map the hook's accept/rollback decision boundary (which tx types / amounts it accepts vs rejects). |
annotate_hook_trace |
Decode an execute_hook trace[] into human-readable values by byte-width: canonical XFL float (definite), int64/native-drops (both endians), UInt32 + Ripple-epoch date, candidate account-id → r-address (possible), 32-byte hash. Raw hex always preserved; offline. |
hook_report |
One-call full report: structure + plain-English classification + security findings + fee. |
hook_execution_postmortem |
Post-mortem a real on-chain tx's hooks: fetch the tx + its meta.HookExecutions + engine result, then run each fired hook's real bytecode through the VM and compare the VM's accept/rollback to what the chain recorded. On-chain decision is authoritative; VM run is LOCAL_VM; agree is null (not false) when degraded/indeterminate. Serial RPC: 1 tx + 1 ledger_entry per unique HookHash. |
vm_fidelity_report |
Honest fidelity metric: replays a committed corpus of real mainnet HookExecutions through the VM and reports agreement % over comparable (non-degraded) runs only; offline. |
classify_hook |
Infer in plain English what a hook does (firewall/emitter/stateful/financial/…). |
hook_diff |
Compare two hook versions — API/HookOn/size deltas + newly-gained sensitive capabilities. |
scaffold_hook |
Generate a starter Hook in C for an intent (firewall/payment-limit/state-counter/…) — then verify with analyze/execute. |
analyze_hook |
Run the static-analysis rule engine over a hook → SARIF-lite findings. |
audit_account_hooks |
Pull every hook on an account and analyze all of them. |
inspect_hook_wasm |
Parse CreateCode WASM: imports, exports (hook/cbak), memory, custom sections, loop, _g guard & instruction counts. |
estimate_hook_fee |
Byte size (SetHook fee) + static instruction count (complexity proxy), ESTIMATE. |
hook_dry_run |
STATIC_ONLY quick check — fires-on-tx + exit calls present (use execute_hook for real runs). |
list_rules · hook_api_lookup |
Enumerate analyzer rules · look up a Hook API function's role & hazards. |
Codec / decode (offline)
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
decode_hook_on / encode_hook_on |
HookOn bitmap ⇄ transaction-type list. |
decode_sethook |
A SetHook tx → its hook definitions, HookOn decoded. |
decode_tx_blob / encode_tx_blob |
Xahau tx blob ⇄ JSON (unsigned). |
decode_uritoken_id · xah_amount |
URIToken ID validation · XAH⇄drops. |
decode_xpop |
Decode an Import/Burn2Mint XPOP → source ledger, inner burn tx, burned drops, UNL validators. |
decode_result |
Engine result code ⇄ name (e.g. 153 ⇄ tecHOOK_REJECTED). |
diagnose_failed_tx |
"Why did my transaction fail?" — plain-English diagnosis from on-chain facts: engine result → cause + concrete fix (~30-code catalog), hook rollback return-strings decoded and interpreted (the reward hook's "You must wait N seconds" becomes a claimable-at date), the partial-payment trap on "successful" Payments, and not-found triage (expired LastLedgerSequence / wrong network). 1 read. |
validate_address · xaddress |
Validate classic/X-address (type, account-id, tag) · encode/decode X-addresses. |
currency_code · ripple_time |
3-char ISO ⇄ 160-bit currency · Ripple-time ⇄ Unix/ISO. |
decode_amount |
Decode native drops / 8-byte / 48-byte issued STAmount / amount object → value+currency+issuer. |
decode_sign_request |
Decode a Xaman txjson or tx_blob → plain-English "what you authorize" + safety warnings. |
decode_lease_uri |
Decode an Evernode lease URIToken (evrlease/LTV) → lease index, EVR amount (XFL), ToS hash, IP. |
evernode_host_diagnostics |
One-call Evernode host health check (the official troubleshooting checklist, automated): registration entry, heartbeat liveness vs the on-chain active rule, instance load, reputation, EVR trustline/balance, registration URIToken, lease offers, machine specs + accumulated EVR reward. Layout verified against the canonical evernode-js-client + a live mainnet host (~9 serial reads). |
inspect_emitted_tx |
Decode a hook's emit() blobs → tx JSON + plain-English summary + danger score. |
scam_check |
Score a sign request (txjson or tx_blob) for risky patterns → dangerScore 0-100 + SAFE/CAUTION/DANGER tier + per-rule findings (SetHook, AccountDelete-to-other, regular-key/signer-list changes, large native payment, no-expiry, pre-signed). Offline heuristic on tx shape only — every finding is a potential risk, never a confirmed scam; no block-list lookup, no on-chain malice check. |
Ledger (read-only RPC)
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
xahau_server_info · get_account_info · get_account_objects |
Node/account reads. |
get_account_hooks · get_hook_definition · get_hook_state |
Hook reads. |
get_transaction · get_ledger · get_fee |
Tx (with HookExecutions) · ledger · current network fee. |
get_account_lines · get_account_offers · get_account_uritokens |
Trustlines · DEX offers · URITokens (NFTs, URI decoded). |
explain_account |
One-call plain-English account snapshot — balance, key safety, hooks, trustlines, Evernode leases, recent activity (5 serial reads). |
Economics / governance
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
reward_status |
Balance Adjustment doctor — opted in? exact accrued XAH (the genesis reward hook's own formula from reward.c, with live RR/RD read from genesis hook state; reproduces a real on-chain GenesisMint payout to the drop), next-claim countdown, overdue-claim warning (late claiming forfeits yield), plus an unsigned opt-in/claim ClaimReward when applicable (3 serial reads). |
compute_reward |
Project claimable XAH network reward (DOCUMENTED_MODEL; legacy — prefer reward_status). |
quantum_grade |
Grade an account for quantum (HNDL) readiness — master-key/regular-key/multisig + hooks → score, tier, recommendations (with a Hook/PQC angle). |
governance_state |
Full live decode of the Governance Game: all 20 seats + members, member count, live reward rate/delay, every open vote (who voted what) and every tally with its threshold (80% membership / 100% else) and reached-flag. Layout canonical from xahaud hook/genesis/govern.c. |
decode_b2m |
Burn2Mint classification. |
Unsigned builders (no keys, testnet-default)
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
build_sethook_unsigned |
UNSIGNED SetHook with automatic analyze_hook preflight. |
build_claimreward_unsigned · build_import_unsigned · build_payment_unsigned |
UNSIGNED ClaimReward · Import/B2M · Payment. |
prepare_transaction |
Autofill Sequence/Fee/LastLedgerSequence/NetworkID from the live network → ready to sign offline (never signs). |
Install
New here or non-technical? Start with the plain-English tutorial — what it does + cool things to just ask.
Install straight from GitHub — no npm-registry account needed; it builds on install:
npm install -g github:Hugegreencandle/xahau-mcp
Or clone and build:
git clone https://github.com/Hugegreencandle/xahau-mcp && cd xahau-mcp
npm install # the `prepare` script compiles dist/ automatically
npm run smoke # health check + a live mainnet read
npm test # 261 tests (offline)
Also published to GitHub Packages as @hugegreencandle/xahau-mcp. GitHub Packages requires auth even for public installs, so add to your .npmrc:
@hugegreencandle:registry=https://npm.pkg.github.com
//npm.pkg.github.com/:_authToken=YOUR_GITHUB_TOKEN # token with read:packages
then npm install -g @hugegreencandle/xahau-mcp. (The github: install above needs no auth and is simpler.)
Add to an MCP client (e.g. Claude Code / Desktop):
{ "mcpServers": { "xahau": { "command": "xahau-mcp" } } }
Security
Designed defensively and reviewed (npm audit + a danger-surface pass):
- Read-only & no key custody — no
sign/submitanywhere; builder tools never accept a secret and only emit unsigned transactions to sign offline. - No code-exec surface — no
eval/Function, nochild_process/shell, no filesystem writes, no dynamicrequire. RPCfetchonly ever hits the fixed endpoints indata/endpoints.json(or yourXAHAU_RPC_URLS/XAHAU_TEST_RPC_URLSoverrides for mainnet/testnet) — never a URL built from tool input, so no SSRF. - Untrusted Hook WASM is sandboxed —
execute_hook/fuzz_hookrun hook bytecode in Node's WebAssembly engine, which has no syscall/fs/network access; a hook can only call the in-memory JS Hook-API shims, with bounds-checked memory reads/writes. - Untrusted-bytecode hardening: before executing a hook the VM refuses modules with an unguarded loop (more loops than
_gguard call-sites), with an opcode-scan that couldn't verify the loops, over 128 KiB of bytecode, or declaring more than 512 memory pages; guarded loops are bounded by a cumulative guard budget + wall-clock cap. So an attacker-supplied hook can't hang or OOM a run. Tool output is data, not instructions (treat it as such, as with any MCP). - Dependencies:
npm auditreports only low-severity advisories transitively underxrpl-accountlib's signing libraries (elliptic/bip32/tiny-secp256k1) — code paths this server never calls (it uses only the binary codec).
How it works
- No heavy deps. Three runtime deps:
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk,zod, andxrpl-accountlib(used only for the Xahau-aware binary codec; its signing surface is never called). RPC is plainfetch; the WASM reader is hand-rolled and zero-dep; the VM uses Node's built-inWebAssemblyengine to run the bytecode with a JS Hook API shim — no WASM toolchain or native deps. - Real data, regenerable.
data/is built from a live Xahau node'sserver_definitionsand the canonical Hook API list (Xahau/hooks-rsc/extern.h) vianpm run fetch:all. The 78-function Hook API catalog carries per-function hazard metadata that drives the analyzer. - HookOn semantics are verified against the Xahau docs: 256-bit, bit n = tx type n, inverted/active-low (set = does not fire), with bit 22 (SetHook) active-high.
License
MIT © 2026 Dane Brown. Not affiliated with XRPL Labs or the Xahau project. Analyzer findings are heuristic guidance, not a security guarantee — always test on testnet and review hooks independently before mainnet use.
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