Midplane

Postgres MCP server for AI agents. Connect the tables you've been keeping
off-limits. PII masked at the source, policy enforced on the SQL AST, writes held
for human approval, everything audited. MIT, self-hostable.

Midplane sits in the query path between an AI agent (Claude, Cursor, any MCP
client) and your Postgres database. Every statement is parsed into a real Postgres
AST — not matched against a regex blocklist — checked against a declarative
per-table policy, rewritten so masked columns never leave the database in the
clear, and recorded in an event-sourced audit log before it executes.

📖 Full documentation lives at midplane.ai/docs —
agent setup, the policy reference, self-hosting, deployment, and the threat model.
This README is just the orientation.

Why this exists

AI coding agents are being plugged into production Postgres without an audit trail
or a safety layer. The deprecated Anthropic reference Postgres MCP shipped a
stacked-statement injection vector (Datadog Security Labs, 2025); the common
service-role setup hands an agent a connection that can read and write every table.
So the tables that would make an agent genuinely useful — customers, orders,
subscriptions — stay off-limits, because "a read-only role and good intentions"
isn't a control anyone can show a security reviewer. Midplane is that control.

What it does

• PII masked at the source. Declare a column masked and the engine rewrites
  the query's source relation, so the raw value never leaves Postgres — masking
  applies inside joins, filters, and aggregates rather than being scrubbed out of
  the rows on the way back. Transforms range from full-redact and null-out to
  consistent-hash (deterministic, salted, so masked join keys still join),
  partial, generalize, pseudonymize, and noise. It fails closed: anything
  the engine can't prove is masked — an unvetted function that could read the
  table behind the parser's back, a result column whose provenance doesn't map to
  a known base column — denies the query rather than risk an unmasked value.
• Policy enforced on the SQL AST. Every statement is parsed by libpg_query
  — Postgres's own parser — and checked against a per-table policy of
  deny / read / read_write, plus optional tenant scoping and categorical
  write guardrails. The walk is recursive, so a write buried in a CTE, subquery,
  or UNION arm is caught at the write, not at the outer SELECT.
• Writes held for human approval. Opt a write class into approvals and the
  engine pauses the statement after the policy has allowed it and asks a human.
  The agent gets a check_approval tool and re-runs when the answer lands; a
  denial carries the reviewer's note back, so "use the refunds table instead"
  reaches the agent. Approvals sit under the policy, never over it — nothing the
  policy denied can be approved into running.
• Everything audited. An event-sourced log written before execution: which
  agent, which token, the statement, the decision and its reason, and which
  columns were masked. Local SQLite for the standalone engine; a queryable,
  exportable audit log in the app.

What it blocks

Out of the box, before you configure anything:

• Destructive writes by default — DELETE FROM users is denied even with a
  WHERE, until you opt the table into read_write.
• Whole-table wipes and schema destruction — no-WHERE DELETE / UPDATE
  and all DROP / TRUNCATE / ALTER, regardless of table policy.
• Stacked-statement injection — SELECT 1; DROP TABLE users denied at parse time.
• Writes hidden inside a read — WITH x AS (DELETE FROM users RETURNING *) SELECT * FROM x is denied at the inner DELETE, not the outer SELECT. The
  same recursive walk covers subqueries, UNION arms, and JOINs.

The full policy model, the parse → policy → mask → audit pipeline, and the
adversarial corpus that pins it are documented at
midplane.ai/docs.

In a real chat

A delete all users prompt to Claude Code, against a Midplane-fronted DB:

⏺ Hold on — that's destructive and irreversible. Before I run
DELETE FROM public.users, please confirm.

user: confirm delete all users

⏺ Midplane blocked it: "writes to table users are not allowed by the
table-access policy." The DELETE was audited but not executed.

Quick start

Three ways in — same open-core codebase behind all of them. Step-by-step guides
are at midplane.ai/docs.

Managed cloud

The fastest way to try Midplane: sign up at app.midplane.ai
and go from zero to your first guarded query in a couple of minutes. Dashboard,
policy and masking editors, approval queue, hosted audit log, agent-token
issuance. Nothing to install, multi-region, fully supported.

Guard one database yourself

Put the MIT engine in front of a Postgres database and point an agent at it.
Nothing to install — npx ships with Node and fetches the
midplane package on first run
(needs Node 22.16+; on anything older it says so and exits). Add this to your
MCP client's config (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor — they all take this
shape):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "midplane": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "midplane", "server", "--stdio"],
      "env": { "DATABASE_URL": "postgres://user:pass@host:5432/db" }
    }
  }
}

Keep the connection string in that env block rather than on a command line,
where it would leak to ps aux and your shell history. The block still lands in
a plaintext config file, so give Midplane its own least-privilege Postgres role:
it governs which SQL runs, not what the role underneath it can reach.

That config is already the safe default: reads allowed, writes and DDL denied,
every query audited to ~/.midplane/audit.db. Read the log back with
npx midplane audit denies. To open specific tables up, generate a policy with
npx midplane init — it introspects your schema over a read-only connection,
suggests a tenant column, and writes a validated midplane.policy.yaml.

Masking and approvals are sections of that same policy file: column_masks names
the columns to mask and the transform to apply (set MIDPLANE_MASK_SALT, and
mask_source_rewrite: true for source rewriting), and approvals holds writes
until a human rules on them. Approvals need somewhere to ask — point the engine at
the app's gate (MIDPLANE_APPROVAL_URL + MIDPLANE_APPROVAL_TOKEN), self-hosted
or cloud, both below.

For a CI pipeline or a long-lived sidecar, the same engine ships as a
self-contained image with no Node in it — midplane/midplane:0.20.0, serving
Streamable HTTP instead of stdio.
Setup · engine/README.md.

Self-host the whole app

The complete single-tenant product — dashboard, policy and masking editors,
approval queue, audit log, agent-token issuance — keyless and uncapped, on your
own Postgres. Docker is the only prerequisite:

git clone https://github.com/midplaneai/midplane && cd midplane
./bin/self-host up                               # → http://localhost:3000

That generates secrets into .env.self-host, brings up Postgres + the web app,
applies migrations on boot, and prints the dashboard URL — the first
email+password signup becomes the owner.

Running from source, the single-image deploy, the engine-spawn topology, and the
full walkthrough: midplane.ai/docs (in-repo:
SELF_HOST.md).

Open core

Midplane is open core, MIT, and self-hostable. Everything outside
apps/web/src/ee/ is the Community Edition — the whole single-tenant product,
uncapped when self-hosted. apps/web/src/ee/ is the commercial Enterprise Edition
(SSO/SAML today; the governance band over time); deleting it leaves a working MIT
build. The managed cloud is the same codebase and the supported, paid path. See
LICENSE for the MIT terms and NOTICE for the ee/
carve-out.

Architecture

One codebase, two deployables:

• Control plane (repo root) — dashboard, policy and masking management,
  approval queue, audit views, agent-token issuance, hosted MCP proxy. MIT except
  apps/web/src/ee/.
• Engine (engine/) — the MIT query-path engine, compiled to a
  self-contained binary. It parses, enforces, masks, and audits; the control plane
  spawns it per project and never reimplements it, so hosted and self-host run the
  exact same engine — only the packaging differs.

apps/web              Next.js dashboard + Better Auth + projects API
packages/db           Drizzle schema (customers, projects, audit index)
packages/kms          encryptDsn / decryptDsn (env-mode dev, AWS KMS prod)
packages/router       Hosted MCP request handler — token → project → engine
engine/               The MIT query-path engine
infra/telemetry-proxy Cloudflare Worker for anonymized OSS install telemetry

Operating the managed multi-region cloud (Fly + Neon + KMS) is in
docs/deploy.md.

Contributing

Issues and PRs welcome — start with CONTRIBUTING.md. The
single highest-leverage contribution is a new entry in the adversarial SQL corpus:
a bypass attempt and the policy fix that defeats it. Commits are DCO-signed
(git commit -s). For security issues, follow SECURITY.md —
don't open a public issue.

License

MIT — see LICENSE. No copyleft, no BSL, no source-available rug-pull.
The one carve-out is apps/web/src/ee/ (the commercial Enterprise Edition, governed
by apps/web/src/ee/LICENSE and recorded in
NOTICE); deleting it leaves a fully working MIT build.

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