aegisdb

mcp
Guvenlik Denetimi
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Bu listing icin henuz AI raporu yok.

SUMMARY

A fast, single-binary C database that gives AI agents durable, searchable long-term memory — with a Claude Code integration.

README.md

AegisDB

Self-hosted memory for your AI agents. One small C binary — multi-tenant,
encrypted, with backups, read replicas, and a one-command Prometheus + Grafana
stack. Your agents' memory stays on your box; nothing ships to a SaaS.

CI
License: MIT
Container: ghcr.io
PyPI: aegisdb-mcp

AI agents forget everything between sessions. AegisDB gives them durable,
searchable long-term memory — episodic history, semantic facts with vector
search, and volatile working memory — behind a dead-simple JSON-over-TCP
protocol, with a first-class Claude Code
integration. It's a single dependency-free binary you run yourself: your data,
your box, no third party in the loop.

The bundled Grafana dashboard for AegisDB — live records, request/op rates, index memory, and more

Quickstart

Run the server — no clone, no toolchain (prebuilt multi-arch image on GHCR):

docker run -d --name aegisdb -p 9470:9470 -v aegis-data:/data \
  ghcr.io/d4n-larsson/aegisdb:latest

Talk to it — the same binary is also the client:

docker exec aegisdb aegisdb client ping
docker exec aegisdb aegisdb client put --type semantic --tags user "prefers dark mode"
docker exec aegisdb aegisdb client search --tags user --top-k 5

Want the whole observability stack (server + Prometheus + a pre-built Grafana
dashboard) in one command? Clone this repo and:

docker compose --profile monitoring up      # dashboard on http://127.0.0.1:3000

Giving Claude Code a persistent memory is a one-liner (with a server
running): uvx --from aegisdb-mcp aegisdb-init — see
Use as Claude Code memory.

Why AegisDB

  • Self-hosted & private. Your agents' memory never leaves your infrastructure
    — no SaaS, no per-token billing, no data-sharing. Encrypt it at rest with one
    flag.
  • One binary, no dependencies. Written in C; the only vendored code is cJSON
    and the crypto. No JVM, no Python runtime, no external database to babysit.
  • Built for teams. Multi-tenant auth (per-namespace, scoped tokens), per-tenant
    quotas + rate limits, online backups, read replicas, and turnkey
    Prometheus/Grafana observability.
  • Claude Code native. Ships an MCP server + hooks so Claude remembers across
    sessions — installable with a single command.
  • Production-minded. Corruption-resilient append-only log, crash recovery,
    a documented security review, and CI that runs ASan/UBSan/TSan plus continuous
    fuzzing.

Features

  • Durable episodic memory — append-only log with magic + CRC32 framing, corruption-resilient recovery, and legacy-log migration
  • Semantic facts — updateable records (latest version wins)
  • Working memory — volatile per-session ring buffer with TTL and promotion
  • Retrieval — lookup by ID, time-range search, tag search (all/any),
    semantic (embedding) search ranked by cosine similarity weighted by
    importance × confidence; count and consolidate (dedup) over the same filters
  • Semantic scale — exact cosine while small; past --ann-threshold an HNSW
    graph for sublinear approximate top-K, built off the write path and sharded so
    the build parallelizes (--ann-shard-target), optionally int8-quantized
  • Relationships — directed edges between records, graph traversal, and
    agent-namespace isolation
  • Multi-tenant auth — optional bearer tokens (constant-time check; ping exempt), each bound to a namespace + scope (ro/rw/admin) so one server safely isolates many tenants
  • Per-tenant limits — optional storage quotas (records/bytes) and a request rate limit per namespace, so one team member's runaway agent can't fill the disk or monopolize the shared server
  • Encryption at rest — optional XChaCha20-Poly1305 (vendored, no crypto dependency) over the log + checkpoints; opt-in via --encryption-key-file, with an offline migrator and encrypted backups/replicas
  • Observabilitystats op plus a drop-in Prometheus exporter + Grafana dashboard (docker compose --profile monitoring up)
  • Operations — online snapshot/restore backups and read replicas
  • Concurrency — sharded poll() event-loop threads (--io-threads); selectable fsync durability (sync / batch / interval)

Requirements

  • Linux (primary target) with GCC 11+ or Clang 14+
  • One of: CMake 3.20+ or GNU Make
  • Python 3.8+ (optional, for the example client below)

Build

With CMake (canonical)

cmake -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
cmake --build build
ctest --test-dir build --output-on-failure   # runs the unit test suite

With Make (no CMake required)

make             # builds build/aegisdb
make test        # builds and runs the C unit tests
make integration # wire-protocol contract tests (launches the server)
make check       # unit + integration
make clean

The server binary is produced at build/aegisdb.

With Docker

Prebuilt multi-arch images (linux/amd64, linux/arm64) are published to GitHub
Container Registry on every push to main and every release tag — no clone or
toolchain needed:

docker run -p 9470:9470 -v aegis-data:/data ghcr.io/d4n-larsson/aegisdb:latest
# or pin a release: ghcr.io/d4n-larsson/aegisdb:0.1.0

To build it yourself instead, a multi-stage Dockerfile (Debian-slim) compiles
the server and ships a minimal runtime image. Data persists in a named volume at
/data.

# Build and run with Docker Compose
docker compose up --build        # serves on localhost:9470

# Or build and run the image directly
docker build -t aegisdb .
docker run -p 127.0.0.1:9470:9470 -v aegis-data:/data aegisdb

Compose is configured by an optional .env file — copy the template and edit:

cp .env.example .env             # then tweak port, durability, tenant limits, …
docker compose up --build

Every setting has a default, so .env is optional. It exposes the common flags
as named vars (AEGIS_PORT, AEGIS_EMBEDDING_DIM, AEGIS_DURABILITY,
AEGIS_TENANT_MAX_RECORDS, …) plus AEGIS_EXTRA_ARGS for anything else
(--auth-token-file, --io-threads, ANN tuning, …). See
.env.example for the full list.

To skip building, point docker-compose.yml at the published image: replace
build: . with image: ghcr.io/d4n-larsson/aegisdb:latest.

The image ships a HEALTHCHECK that uses the binary's built-in --health-check
probe (no extra tooling in the image), so docker ps and Compose
depends_on: condition: service_healthy reflect real server liveness.

The container runs as an unprivileged user. The server listens on 0.0.0.0:9470
inside the container, but Compose publishes that port on the host's loopback
(127.0.0.1) only by default — because the wire protocol is unauthenticated and
plaintext out of the box, it must not be reachable off-box until you secure it.
To expose it deliberately, set AEGIS_BIND=0.0.0.0 (or a specific host IP) in
.env, and first enable authentication: mount a token file into /data and add
--auth-token-file /data/tokens.txt (to AEGIS_EXTRA_ARGS under Compose; see
Authentication). Even with auth, tokens travel in plaintext,
so terminate TLS at a trusted proxy for any non-loopback exposure. Override other
flags by appending them to the run command, e.g. docker run aegisdb --embedding-dim 1024, or (with Compose) via .env.

Run

./build/aegisdb --data-dir ./data --port 9470

Expected startup output:

2026-06-28 12:00:00.000 INFO  [aegisdb] AegisDB 0.1.0 starting (log level: info)
2026-06-28 12:00:00.000 WARN  [aegisdb] no auth tokens configured; ...
2026-06-28 12:00:00.000 INFO  [aegisdb] recovery complete: N records loaded
2026-06-28 12:00:00.000 INFO  [aegisdb] listening on 0.0.0.0:9470
2026-06-28 12:00:00.000 INFO  [aegisdb] data directory: ./data

Logs go to stderr as <timestamp> <LEVEL> [aegisdb] <message>. Control the
verbosity with --log-level error|warn|info|debug (default info) or the
AEGISDB_LOG_LEVEL environment variable — the flag takes precedence. At
debug, the server logs every accepted connection and dispatched operation.

The WARN line appears only when the server is started without
--auth-token/--auth-token-file (see Authentication).

Talk to it

The same binary is also a client — no nc, no hand-written JSON:

aegisdb client ping
aegisdb client put --type semantic --tags user "prefers dark mode"
aegisdb client get 1
aegisdb client search --tags user --top-k 5
aegisdb client stats

Host, port, and token default to $AEGIS_HOST / $AEGIS_PORT / $AEGIS_TOKEN
(127.0.0.1 / 9470 / none) or --host/--port/--token. The exit code is
0 on an ok response, so it scripts cleanly. Inside Docker:
docker exec aegisdb aegisdb client stats.

To create a tenant token, gen-token prints a ready token-file line (hashed)
and the one-time plaintext token:

$ aegisdb gen-token --namespace acme --scope rw
sha256$… acme rw          # paste into your --auth-token-file
token: 9f3c…              # give to the client (AEGIS_TOKEN); not recoverable

Configuration flags

Flag Default Description
--data-dir <path> ./data Persistence directory
--port <n> 9470 TCP listen port
--phase <1-4> 4 Highest enabled feature phase (gates operations)
--io-threads <n> 2× CPUs (8–64) poll() event-loop threads for dispatch parallelism (does not cap concurrent connections). Alias: --workers
--max-payload <bytes> 1048576 Max data size (1 MiB)
--embedding-dim <n> 384 Expected embedding vector length
--ann-threshold <n> 10000 Live vectors before semantic search switches from exact scan to the HNSW graph
--ann-ef-search <n> HNSW default HNSW query beam width (recall/latency knob)
--ann-shard-target <n> 25000 Target vectors per HNSW shard; the graph splits into ~`count/n` shards (capped by CPUs) so the build parallelizes
--ann-quantize off Store HNSW vectors as int8 (~4× less memory, small recall cost)
--durability <mode> interval sync (fsync per write), batch (per --fsync-batch records), or interval (per --fsync-interval-ms)
--fsync-batch <n> 1000 Records between fsync calls in batch mode
--fsync-interval-ms <n> 1000 Flush cadence in interval mode (floored at the ~1s maintenance tick)
--checkpoint-sec <n> 60 Index checkpoint cadence so recovery replays only the tail; 0 disables
--compact-sec <n> 300 Log-compaction check cadence; compacts only when enough of the log is dead; 0 disables
--tenant-max-records <n> 0 Per-namespace live-record cap (0 = unlimited); enforced only when auth is enabled
--tenant-max-bytes <n> 0 Per-namespace live-byte cap (0 = unlimited)
--tenant-rate-qps <n> 0 Per-namespace request rate limit in req/s, burst = 1s (0 = unlimited)
--max-index-bytes <n> 0 Soft cap on in-RAM index size; inserts return MEMORY_LIMIT past it so a growing dataset backpressures instead of getting OOM-killed (accepts K/M/G; 0 = unlimited). Watch stats.memory.
--replication-port <n> Serve the read-replica log stream on this port (primary; requires --replication-token)
--replication-token <t> Token to subscribe to / follow the replication stream
--replicate-from <h:p> Follow this primary's replication port as a read-only replica (implies --read-only)
--read-only off Refuse client writes (READ_ONLY)
--working-capacity <n> 256 Working-memory ring buffer size
--restore <dir> One-shot: install the snapshot at <dir> into an empty --data-dir, then exit
--log-level <level> info error, warn, info, or debug (also $AEGISDB_LOG_LEVEL)
--auth-token <token> Accept this global admin token (repeatable)
--auth-token-file <path> Accept tokens, one per line: <token> [namespace] [ro|rw|admin]; a token may be sha256$<hex> (hashed at rest)
--hash-token <token> Print the token's sha256$<hex> form and exit (paste into the token file)
--encryption-key-file <path> Encrypt the log + checkpoints at rest with the 32-byte key (64 hex chars) in <path> (Encryption at rest)
--encrypt-migrate Rewrite --data-dir's plaintext log encrypted (needs --encryption-key-file) and exit
--health-check Probe a local server on --port, print nothing, exit 0 if healthy / 1 otherwise
--help Show usage

Authentication & multi-tenancy

Setting up a shared server for a team? Follow the step-by-step
team server tutorial instead of assembling the
flags below by hand.

With no --auth-token/--auth-token-file, the server runs without
authentication
and every request is served with unrestricted access. When
tokens are configured, each request must carry a matching "token" field
(except ping, which is always exempt) or the server returns UNAUTHORIZED.
Tokens are compared in constant time.

Each token in the token file is bound to a namespace and a scope:

admin-key                 # global admin: any namespace, all operations
acme-key      acme   rw   # tenant "acme", read+write
acme-view     acme   ro   # tenant "acme", read-only
beta-key      beta   rw   # tenant "beta"

A namespaced token can only write into its own namespace (agent_id is pinned
automatically) and only read its own records — another tenant's records read
back as NOT_FOUND. Read-only tokens are refused writes with FORBIDDEN, and
stats is admin-only. This lets one server back many isolated tenants/agents.

Tokens can also be managed at runtime (no restart) by an admin token via the
token_list / token_add / token_revoke operations — a revoked token stops
authenticating immediately, and changes persist back to --auth-token-file
(rewritten hashed). Tokens are referenced by a fingerprint id, so they can be
listed and revoked without exposing the secret. See
docs/wire-protocol.md.

Tokens can be stored hashed so a leaked token file reveals nothing usable.
Run aegisdb --hash-token <tok> to get its sha256$<hex> form and put that in
the token file; clients still send the plaintext token, which the server hashes
and compares in constant time. Use high-entropy tokens (openssl rand -hex 32).

Tokens are sent in plaintext, so run the server behind an encrypted channel — a
TLS-terminating reverse proxy (nginx/Caddy), stunnel, or a private network.
TLS is intentionally kept out of the binary to preserve the single,
dependency-free build.

Encryption at rest

The log and index checkpoints can be encrypted on disk with
XChaCha20-Poly1305 (vendored — no crypto dependency added), so a stolen disk,
volume snapshot, or backup tarball reveals nothing without the key. Mint a key
and start with it:

aegisdb gen-key > key.hex           # 32-byte key, 64 hex chars; store it 0600
aegisdb --data-dir ./data --encryption-key-file key.hex
  • Opt-in and per-directory. A data dir created without a key stays
    plaintext. On a new dir the key encrypts from the first write; to convert an
    existing plaintext dir, run the offline one-shot
    aegisdb --encrypt-migrate --data-dir ./data --encryption-key-file key.hex.
  • Fail-closed. The server refuses to start if the key does not match the dir
    (wrong key, or a key given for a plaintext dir / no key for an encrypted one).
  • Backups stay encrypted; --restore requires the same key (the snapshot
    manifest records a non-secret key fingerprint and is checked before restoring).
  • Replicas must be configured with the same --encryption-key-file; the
    subscribe handshake rejects a key mismatch. Each node encrypts its own log with
    the key.
  • Scope. This protects data at rest. It is not a transport control (the
    wire, including replication, is still plaintext — front it with a proxy as
    above) and does not protect a running process's memory. Keep the key safe and
    separate from the data dir; without it the data is unrecoverable.

Wire Protocol

Newline-delimited JSON (NDJSON) over TCP — one JSON object per line per
request/response. See docs/wire-protocol.md
for the full contract.

# Health check
echo '{"operation":"ping"}' | nc -q1 localhost 9470

# Insert an episodic memory
echo '{"operation":"insert","type":"episodic","tags":["user","preference"],"data":"User likes coffee"}' | nc -q1 localhost 9470

# Retrieve by ID
echo '{"operation":"get","id":1}' | nc -q1 localhost 9470

# Time-range search
echo '{"operation":"search","start_time":0,"end_time":9999999999999,"top_k":10}' | nc -q1 localhost 9470

# Tag search
echo '{"operation":"search","tags":["user"],"match":"all","top_k":10}' | nc -q1 localhost 9470

Supported operations: ping, insert (episodic/semantic/working, single or
batch), get, update (semantic), delete (by id or query), search
(time/tags/embedding), count, consolidate, promote, relate, traverse,
stats, snapshot, and token administration (token_list/token_add/token_revoke).

Python client example

import socket, json

def request(payload: dict) -> dict:
    with socket.create_connection(("localhost", 9470)) as s:
        s.sendall((json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode())
        return json.loads(s.recv(65536).decode())

print(request({"operation": "ping"}))
print(request({"operation": "insert", "type": "episodic",
               "tags": ["demo"], "data": "Hello from quickstart"}))

Project Layout

src/
├── main.c              # Entry point, CLI args, client subcommands
├── server/             # TCP NDJSON server, sharded poll() event loops
├── protocol/           # JSON request parsing / response building
├── query/              # Operation router / query engine
├── storage/            # Append-only log, hash/time/tag/semantic indexes,
│                       #   compaction, recovery
├── memory/             # MemoryRecord encode/decode, working buffer
└── util/               # CRC32, SHA-256, config, health check, client, logging
include/aegisdb/        # Public headers
tests/                  # unit/, integration/, contract/
third_party/            # Vendored cJSON and Unity
data/                   # Runtime data (gitignored)

Crash Recovery

AegisDB persists episodic and semantic records to an append-only
memory.log with per-frame header and payload CRC32 checksums. On startup it
loads the index checkpoint (memory.index) and replays only the log tail written
since — falling back to a full scan if the checkpoint is missing or corrupt —
then rebuilds the in-memory indexes. A torn tail from a mid-write crash is
trimmed; interior corruption is skipped frame by frame so the surrounding records
still load. To verify:

  1. Insert several records.
  2. kill -9 <pid> the server.
  3. Restart it — startup logs recovery complete: N records loaded.
  4. get each ID; all records return intact.

Backups & disaster recovery

Recovery + a durable volume + restart: unless-stopped already survive a
process crash. To survive losing the host or disk, take backups off the box.

AegisDB is single-node by design (no built-in replication), and because the log
is append-only a backup is just a consistent snapshot of its durable prefix. The
admin snapshot op writes one online (no downtime); --restore installs it into
an empty data dir. scripts/aegis-backup.sh automates
the loop — snapshot → tarball → ship off-box via a transport you supply (S3,
rclone, rsync, …) → local retention:

# host cron (daily), shipping to S3:
AEGIS_BACKUP_UPLOAD_CMD='aws s3 cp {} s3://my-bucket/aegis/' \
  scripts/aegis-backup.sh

Or run it on a schedule as the opt-in compose sidecar:

docker compose --profile backup up -d      # loops the script (default: daily)

Restore a shipped tarball into a fresh server:

tar -xzf aegis-20260709T....tar.gz -C /tmp/snap
aegisdb --restore /tmp/snap/aegis-20260709T... --data-dir ./restored --embedding-dim 384
aegisdb --data-dir ./restored --embedding-dim 384    # start; recovery rebuilds indexes

See .env.example for the backup knobs (AEGIS_BACKUP_UPLOAD_CMD,
AEGIS_BACKUP_INTERVAL, AEGIS_BACKUP_RETAIN). The transport is pluggable so no
cloud SDK is baked into the image — the same "bring your own edge" stance as TLS.

Do not scale the server with deploy: replicas: N against the shared
volume: AegisDB is single-writer (one append-only log, one id allocator), so
multiple writers would corrupt the data. Backups and read replicas (below) are
the supported resilience path.

Read replicas

For read availability and read scaling, a read-only replica follows a primary
by streaming its append-only log and replaying it — always the same frames in the
same order, so the replica's log is byte-identical and offsets line up. Replicas
are asynchronous (eventually consistent, bounded by lag) and read-only; promotion
after a primary failure is a manual, operator-fenced step. Full design and the
promotion runbook: docs/read-replica-design.md.

# primary: serve the replication stream (needs a token)
aegisdb --data-dir ./p --port 9470 \
        --replication-port 9480 --replication-token "$TOKEN"

# replica: follow the primary, serve read-only on its own port
aegisdb --data-dir ./r --port 9471 \
        --replicate-from 127.0.0.1:9480 --replication-token "$TOKEN"

Send writes to the primary and spread reads across either; a write to a replica
returns READ_ONLY. stats reports the replication posture (role,
lag_bytes, connected replicas). Compaction on the primary rewrites offsets, so
a replica automatically re-bootstraps when it detects the change. Every node
must use the same --embedding-dim. The stream is authenticated by the token but
not encrypted — keep it on a trusted network / behind a TLS proxy, like the
client protocol.

Use as Claude Code memory

AegisDB can act as the persistent long-term memory of Claude Code
via the integration in integrations/claude-code/:
an MCP server exposing memory tools plus hooks for automatic recall and capture.
It is published to PyPI as aegisdb-mcp,
so uvx aegisdb-mcp runs it with no clone. Fastest setup: with a server
running, uvx --from aegisdb-mcp aegisdb-init scaffolds .mcp.json and the hooks
for you (or install the /aegis-setup skill and let Claude do it). See
integrations/claude-code/README.md for
that and the manual step-by-step.

Documentation

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